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The development and implementation of a national 
cybersecurity strategy (NCS) is becoming increasingly 
common for countries around the world that seek to 
define an approach for addressing their cybersecurity 
risks. Although past research has sought to classify the 
individual characteristics contained within an NCS, it 
remains unclear how the core content within a strategy 
evolves over time in the face of new cyber threats and 
fluctuating priorities. By better understanding such 
changes (and their underlying drivers), policy makers 
can be increasingly attuned to essential NCS updates 
and citizens can more readily evaluate the adequacy of 
their country’s plans. This study examines multiple NCS 
versions in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia 
using a qualitative, content analysis approach. Our 
results point to four core themes that characterize NCS 
stability and change over time. Based on our 
observations, we articulate several theoretical 
propositions and outline a plan for future research. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The leaders of countries around the world are 
becoming increasingly attuned to the growing level of 
cybersecurity risks facing their nations. The threat of 
targeted attacks against critical infrastructure and 
national security apparatus, as well as the specific risks 
of cybersecurity incidents impacting individual citizens 
are acknowledged as being extremely high [1]. 
In response, policy makers in many countries have 
constructed national cybersecurity strategy (NCS) 
guidelines [2]. These documents commonly include an 
articulation of threats, objectives, and plans of action 
related to cybersecurity events, although no broadly 
accepted set of norms associated with NCS development 
has yet been established [3, 4]. 
Past research highlights the difficulty that policy 
makers face in defining an NCS that works for 
government, industry, and civilians [5]. These 
challenges are particularly acute in developing 
countries, where economies are emerging and fewer 
cybersecurity resources are available [3]. Indeed, past 
research points to notable differences in NCS content 
across countries [4]. Despite early views that NCS 
design elements could be relatively uniform around the 
world, more recent perspectives argue that differences 
should be expected as a result of factors such as the 
technical and administrative capabilities of a country 
[3]. 
One of the key challenges that policy makers face 
is the changing environment in which the NCS must 
apply. This is particularly difficult due to rapid 
innovation and continually emerging threats [5]. While 
the first wave of NCS guidelines were released in many 
countries beginning about a decade ago, those same 
countries have typically updated and refined their NCS 
documents in the intervening years to take into account 
these new realities. However, past research has 
primarily adopted a cross-sectional, point-in-time 
assessment of NCS documents, either by comparing the 
approaches of several countries [e.g., 4, 5, 6] or by 
conducting an in-depth analysis of a single country [e.g., 
7, 8]. Despite the recognition that an NCS should be 
reviewed and updated every few years [9], there has 
been little examination of the specific nature of the 
changes that stem from these updates. 
This study seeks to address this opportunity by 
posing the following research question: To what extent 
does the content within a national cybersecurity strategy 
change (or remain the same) over time? By better 
understanding how NCS content evolves from one 
version to the next, policy makers can be increasingly 
attuned to the updates that may be necessary to maintain 
a robust strategy, while citizens can track the continuing 
refinement of their country’s plans over time. Further, 
insights from our study can benefit research by 
identifying the underlying factors that drive change (or 
stability) in NCS documents over time. 
To address our research question, we undertook a 
qualitative, content analysis approach to investigate 
both initial and revised NCS documents in Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia. Our findings reveal 
four core themes that capture elements of both stability 
and change over time: understanding the current 
environment; teamwork; security and protective 
actions; and preparing for the future. 
In the next section, we outline the key elements and 
trends within the study of NCS. We then describe our 





research methodology and detail the study’s results. 
Next, we discuss how our study advances research and 
practice in the field. We conclude with directions for 
future research, including a series of associated 
theoretical propositions.  
2. Conceptual foundations 
Broadly, cybersecurity refers to “the prevention of 
damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and—if 
needed—the restoration of electronic information and 
communications systems, and the information they 
contain, in order to strengthen the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of these systems” [10, p. 41]. 
In order to achieve these objectives on a national scale, 
governments are increasingly choosing to design and 
implement an NCS, which represents a “a national plan 
of action based upon a national vision to achieve a set of 
objectives that contribute to the security of the 
cyberspace domain” [4, p. 4]. In creating an NCS, a 
country’s goal is typically to align government efforts 
towards cybersecurity improvements [3]. A variety of 
components can be included in a country’s NCS, 
including articulating a link to other national strategies, 
highlighting the relevant threats, outlining the nation’s 
vision, objectives and principles for cybersecurity, as 
well as prescribing detailed plans of action [4]. 
Three paradigms are attributed to interpreting 
cybersecurity challenges at a national level, based upon 
national security theory, economic theory, and public 
health theory [3, 11]. These paradigms provide a 
philosophical context for the motivations driving an 
engagement in an NCS initiative. From a national 
security perspective, cybersecurity is viewed as a legal 
issue of importance to the security of the country. Such 
an approach tends to place importance on the military to 
influence NCS development. When considering NCS 
from an economic viewpoint, cybersecurity is perceived 
as a key element driving commerce. Finally, a public 
health model of NCS approaches cybersecurity as 
representing a public good and infers that its 
effectiveness can have broad benefits to stakeholders [1, 
3].  
Beyond these philosophical motivations, the 
practical impetus to develop an NCS tends to originate 
from three main sources: a desire to protect national 
security (e.g., protecting state secrets), an interest in 
jurisprudence (e.g., ensuring adherence to the law), and 
political interests (e.g., strengthening diplomacy) [5]. 
However, regardless of the motivation, NCS documents 
have been criticized in past research for suffering from 
a lack of common terminology, difficulties in finding a 
balance between being too strict and too open, and 
adequately representing the interests of various 
stakeholders in terms of government, industry, and 
civilians  [4, 5]. 
Much of the past research on NCS-related topics 
has examined the characteristics of a particular NCS in 
place in a few selected countries or regions, such as the 
USA, the EU, and Japan [12], while other studies 
consider a wider range of comparisons across ten or 
more countries [e.g., 13]. Other work has conducted an 
extensive analysis of a single country, including Israel 
[14], Myanmar [15], Nigeria [8], and Portugal [7]. 
Stemming from these studies are guidelines and 
suggestions on NCS best practices. For example, 
Newmeyer [3] highlights the importance of having 
senior political leadership support, establishing a legal 
framework in order to establish stakeholder 
responsibilities, and facilitating information campaigns 
to increase public awareness.  
Despite this valuable stream of research, very little 
attention has been paid to how national cybersecurity 
strategies change over time. One exception is research 
by Schallbruch and Skierka [16] who consider three 
phases of cybersecurity strategy development in 
Germany during 1991 to 2018. Such longitudinal 
studies can provide unique insights pertaining to the 
themes within an NCS that are important and remain so 
over time, versus those that may only be present in a 
single NCS version. Over time, as countries develop 
their strategic direction, important attributes will receive 
more attention while unimportant attributes will be 
expected to diminish in importance. 
3. Methodology 
We utilized a qualitative, content analysis approach 
to examine the NCS documents in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia. Due to our primary focus on 
identifying elements of change or stability over time, we 
deemed a qualitative approach to be appropriate in that 
it would enable an in-depth assessment of the source 
documents [17, 18]. We also note that past work 
investigating NCS content commonly draws upon 
qualitative methods [e.g., 4, 5]. Although the application 
of longitudinal perspectives is not yet common in the 
study of NCS documents, past work in other fields has 
highlighted the importance of considering the factors 
that drive change in phenomena over time [19, 20]. 
3.1. Data collection  
We used several criteria to determine which 
countries’ NCS documents would be most suitable to 
study. First, we restricted our focus to countries that had 
at least two versions of an NCS (i.e., an initial NCS and 
at least one subsequent revision) that were published in 
English and publicly available. Second, to make the 
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NCS changes comparable, we sought countries that had 
roughly the same interval between NCS versions and 
were published at roughly the same time (e.g., within 
two years). Finally, we were interested in obtaining a 
diverse set of perspectives on NCS approaches and 
sought to select countries from distinct regions around 
the world.  
We identified three countries that met the inclusion 
criteria for our study: Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia. Canada issued its first NCS in 2010 and its 
second in 2018. In comparison, the United Kingdom 
issued its first NCS in 2009, as well as revised versions 
in both 2011 and 2016. Finally, Australia’s NCS was 
first published in 2009, followed by updates in 2016 and 
again in 2020.  
Each NCS was obtained from its country’s official 
federal government website. Due to our study’s focus on 
the NCS, we excluded a review of any supplementary 
materials (e.g., action plans) from our scope. In total, the 
combined NCS documents comprised 370 pages of text. 
Refer to Table 1 for a summary of the NCS documents 
we assessed. 
 
Table 1. NCS documents listing 
NCS Title Country Year Pages 
Canada’s Cyber Security 
Strategy 
Canada 2010 17 
NCSS: Canada’s Vision 
for Security and 
Prosperity in the Digital 
Age 
Canada 2018 40 
Cyber Security Strategy 




U.K. Cyber Security 
Strategy: Protecting and 
Promoting the U.K. in 









Cyber Security Strategy Australia 2009 38 
Australia’s Cyber 
Security Strategy 
Australia 2016 68 
Australia’s Cyber 
Security Strategy 2020 
Australia 2020 52 
3.2. Data analysis  
Our data analysis consisted of qualitative coding of 
the text passages within each NCS using NVivo 
software (version 12). We started by examining 
Canada’s NCS documents and carefully reviewed the 
content with the objective of identifying patterns and 
themes [21]. As areas of interest were identified within 
the documents, they were discussed by the author team. 
This process continued on an iterative basis and these 
themes were expanded and/or consolidated as new ideas 
emerged. In NVivo, each theme was initially 
represented by a first-round code that was linked to a 
collection of related passages from the NCS. These first-
round codes were then consolidated into broader 
second-round code categories. As the data analysis 
continued with the NCS documents in the United 
Kingdom and Australia, we continued to update and 
refine our coding scheme. 
Next, we reviewed the coding patterns that emerged 
in NVivo for each individual country, with a focus on 
changes in coding between different versions of the 
NCS (e.g., Canada 2010 versus Canada 2018). We 
considered both the quantity, as well as the context of 
the coded passages, and inferred the relative emphasis 
and importance of that theme in each NCS document. 
For example, if the theme “workforce of the future” had 
two coded passages in Canada’s 2010 NCS and ten 
coded passages in the 2018 NCS, we concluded that 
relative to the 2010 document, the 2018 version put 
greater emphasis on the theme’s focus. We conducted 
this within-country analysis for all three countries in our 
scope. Refer to Figure 1 for details on our first and 
second round coding activities. 
 
Figure 1. First and second round of coding. 
Finally, after comparing the coding results within 
each country, we moved on to compare our initial 
observations across the three countries. In particular, we 
sought to identify if the patterns we had identified in 
each individual country were similar or different to 
those patterns from the other countries. In using this 
approach, we essentially treated each country as a stand-
alone case study, with data “snapshots” at each point in 
time where an NCS was published. In doing so, we 
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extended the within-case analysis explained above (e.g., 
how the content in Canada’s NCS changed over time) to 
engage in a cross-case analysis (e.g., how the changes in 
Canada’s NCS over time compares to the changes in the 
United Kingdom’s NCS over time) [22]. 
4. Results 
Four core themes emerged from our analysis, which 
correspond with the second-round codes noted in the 
previous section: understanding the current 
environment; teamwork; preparing for the future; and 
security and protective actions. In some cases, these 
themes highlighted issues of stability in an NCS over 
time, while in other cases, the themes pointed to key 
changes. We describe each theme below, then outline 
the applicability of the theme to each country. 
 
4.1. Understanding the current environment 
 
A key component of an NCS is to introduce the 
reader to the concept of cybersecurity and why it is 
important to a country. As society becomes more 
connected, adopting cybersecurity practices becomes 
paramount to mitigating cybersecurity gaps and 
protecting digital information. Our results indicate that 
NCS documents typically recognize how cybersecurity 
can address the challenges of the current digital 
environment. Moreover, the NCS documents provide 
examples of cyber threats conducted by cyber threat 
actors if cybersecurity measures are not adopted. 
 
4.1.1. Canada Both NCS documents recognize the 
benefits and costs of relying on digital technology. For 
example, in the 2010 NCS, Canadians are said to be 
“…embracing the many advantages that cyberspace 
offers, and our economy and quality of life are the better 
for it. But our increasing reliance on cyber technologies 
makes us more vulnerable to those who attack our 
digital infrastructure to undermine our national security, 
economic prosperity, and way of life” [23, p. 1]. To 
highlight the importance of cybersecurity, both NCS 
documents provide examples of cyber threats (e.g., 
privacy loss, financial extortion) that illustrate how 
individuals and/or businesses can be targeted. 
 
4.1.2. The United Kingdom All three versions of the 
United Kingdom’s NCS recognize that embracing the 
digital environment increases exposure to cyber threats. 
For instance, the United Kingdom’s NCS suggests that 
the “…use of cyberspace is [characterized] by 
increasing levels of reliance as government, business, 
and individuals, continue to benefit from the significant 
advantages of our increasingly networked society. With 
this growing dependence, however, comes an increased 
level of exposure and vulnerability to some of the 
national security threats that interact with and through 
cyber space” [24, p. 12]. This NCS also provides 
examples of cyber threat actors (e.g., criminals, states, 
terrorists) and methods of attack (e.g., electronic attacks, 
subversion of the supply chain and radio signals) [24]. 
Interestingly, we noted that the 2009 NCS introduces 
cybersecurity in an approachable manner through a 
question-and-answer format. Questions include “Who is 
this for? What is cyber space? Why is cyber space 
important? What do we mean by cyber security? Why 
does the UK need a cyber security strategy?” [24, pp. 7-
9]. 
 
4.1.3. Australia All three versions of Australia’s NCS 
recognize the benefits and costs of relying on the current 
digital environment. For example, the 2020 NCS 
suggests that “Australians are rightfully seizing the 
opportunities of our digital world. However, as the 
opportunities have increased, so too have cyber threats” 
[25, p. 6]. Further examples of cyber threat actors and 
cyber consequences are also included to highlight the 
importance of cybersecurity, such as the following 
quote from the 2016 NCS: “Australian organizations 
across the public and private sectors have been 
compromised by state-sponsored or non-state actors” 
[26, p. 6]. 
 
4.2. Teamwork  
 
Cyber threats can come from anywhere in the world 
and each individual, business, and government can be 
targeted. In response, countries have developed 
comprehensive NCS documents to help mitigate this 
risk. However, implementing an NCS is a complex task 
that requires the collaboration and support from multiple 
stakeholders. Our results indicate that NCS documents 
highlight the importance of establishing and fostering 
relationships with domestic (i.e., private sector, 
academia, local government) and international partners. 
Moreover, we noted that implementing any one NCS is 
a collective responsibility in which many stakeholders 
have a role to play.   
 
4.2.1. Canada Both Canadian NCS documents 
recognize teamwork as a key component of its strategy 
and each NCS has a dedicated section focused on 
teamwork. For example, “Partnering to secure vital 
cyber systems outside the government” is discussed in 
the 2010 NCS [23, p. 7], and “Leadership and 
Collaboration” is discussed in the 2018 NCS [27, p. 31]. 
Both NCS documents also recognize that cybersecurity 
is a collective responsibility. For example, the 2010 
NCS states that “we all have a role to play as we take 
full advantage of cyberspace to build a safe, resilient and 
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innovative Canada” [23, p. 7]. Interestingly, developing 
the 2018 NCS was also a collective effort. The federal 
government administered an online public consultation 
that sought the views of Canadians from the private 
sector, academia, and other groups on the country’s 
cyber security landscape [27]. 
 
4.2.2. The United Kingdom Teamwork is also a 
prominent theme in the United Kingdom’s NCS. For 
example, the 2009 NCS “…highlights the need for 
Government, organizations across all sectors, 
international partners and the public to work together to 
meet our strategic objectives of reducing risk and 
exploiting opportunities” [24, p. 8]. Moreover, each 
version of the NCS recognizes that cybersecurity is a 
collective responsibility. The 2011 NCS states that 
“achieving this vision will require everybody, the 
private sector, individuals and governments to work 
together. Just as we all benefit from the use of 
cyberspace, so we all have a responsibility to protect it” 
[28, p. 22]. 
 
4.2.3. Australia The Australian NCS documents 
discuss teamwork from an international perspective. In 
the 2009 NCS, Australia notes an intention to actively 
engage in the international community with countries 
that have similar concerns about cybersecurity. The 
international community includes the “United Nations, 
International telecommunication union (ITU), Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OeCD)” [29, p. 15]. Moreover, the 
Australian NCS documents recognize that the success of 
their implementation depends on the input of ordinary 
individuals. For example, “not all cyber security risks 
can be addressed by governments and industry – 
individuals should also take steps to protect themselves” 
[25, p. 10]. Finally, similar to Canada, “the Australian 
government released a public discussion paper to give 
every Australian a say in the development” of the 2020 
NCS [25, p. 17]. 
 
4.3. Preparing for the future 
 
The digital environment is constantly changing as 
new technologies are developed. These advancements 
can introduce new cyber risks that circumvent existing 
cybersecurity controls. To avoid being complacent, 
countries can develop an NCS that addresses the 
challenges of today, as well as those of the future. Our 
results suggest that countries prepare for the future 
digital environment through three methods: investing in 
research and development, developing the workforce of 
the future, and supporting the cybersecurity industry for 
economic growth. 
4.3.1. Canada Research and development – Compared 
to the 2010 NCS, the 2018 NCS emphasized research 
and development to a much greater extent. For example, 
the 2018 NCS acknowledges that the federal 
government “… has a role to play to support advanced 
research” and build expertise in emerging technologies 
[27, p. 20]. Similarly, the 2018 NCS states that “the 
Government will focus on emerging areas of Canadian 
excellence such as quantum computing and blockchain 
technologies” [27, p. 24]. The 2018 NCS also focuses 
on partnering with post-secondary institutions. For 
example, “…there are also great ideas and strong 
leadership in our schools and our post-secondary 
institutions that will be instrumental in shaping the 
future of cyber security in Canada” [27, p. 29]. 
Workforce of the future – Developing the workforce 
of the future is not discussed substantively in the 2010 
NCS. However, the 2018 NCS recognizes the risk of an 
ill-equipped workforce. For example, “a shortage of 
cyber security talent makes it difficult for organizations 
– including the federal government – to attract and retain 
the people they need to improve their cyber security or 
to disrupt cyber threats” [27, p. 10]. Moreover, 
providing educational and professional opportunities to 
young adults can increase the baseline of the 
workforce’s cyber literacy. The federal government 
“…can encourage more students to move into science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
fields. We can encourage graduates of both STEM 
programs and other disciplines to specialize in the skills 
needed for cyber security jobs” [27, p. 22]. 
Economic growth – Both Canadian NCS 
documents recognize the importance of developing the 
cybersecurity industry for economic growth. For 
example, in the 2010 NCS, cybersecurity is important 
for “…building a secure and trusted business 
environment, [that] will foster the productivity and 
innovation and that drive our economic prosperity” [23, 
p. 11]. Further, developing and introducing innovative 
cybersecurity products to the market is a key driver of 
economic growth. For example, the 2010 NCS states 
that “we will explore initiatives to ensure that Canadian 
companies can bring their products to a global market” 
[23, p. 24].  
 
4.3.2. The United Kingdom Research and development 
– Since the United Kingdom’s first NCS, it has 
continuously expanded the importance of research and 
development. For example, in the 2011 NCS, the United 
Kingdom plans to “strengthen [its] academic base by 
developing a coherent cross-sector research agenda on 
cyber…” [28, p. 29]. Moreover, the 2016 NCS discusses 
plans to “commercialize innovation in academia, 
providing training and mentoring to academics”, 
“establish innovation centers to drive the development 
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of cutting-edge cyber products”, and “provide funding 
and support for the Academic Centres of Excellence, 
Research Institutes and Centres for Doctoral Training” 
[30, pp. 58-59]. 
Workforce of the future – The United Kingdom has 
consistently recognized the importance of developing its 
workforce with the necessary skills and knowledge. For 
example, the 2009 NCS plans to “ensure the growth of 
skills and expertise needed by the Government and 
industry in the cyber security field” [24, p. 23].  The 
2016 NCS also recognizes “the lack of young people 
entering the profession [and] the shortage of current 
cyber security specialists” [30, p. 55]. To mitigate this 
risk, “the Government’s ambition is to ensure the 
sustained supply of the best possible home-grown 
talent…” [30, p. 55]. 
Economic growth – The United Kingdom’s NCS 
documents recognized the importance of fostering a safe 
online marketplace to conduct e-commerce and to 
develop innovative products for the market. For 
example, the 2016 NCS states that “the Government will 
support the creation of a growing, innovative and 
thriving cyber security sector in the UK…” [30, p. 57]. 
 
4.3.3. Australia Research and development – From its 
first NCS, Australia has recognized the importance of 
investing in research and development. For example, in 
the 2009 NCS, the government will provide “targeted 
funding and support for cyber security research and 
development activities” [29, p. 32]. 
Workforce of the future – Australia’s first NCS also 
discusses the importance of developing its future 
workforce and expands on this theme in its successive 
NCS documents. For example, in the 2016 NCS, it states 
that “[improving] cyber security education at all levels 
of the education system” and encouraging students to 
enroll in STEM programs will improve the workforce’s 
baseline cyber literacy [26, p. 55]. 
Economic growth – Developing the cybersecurity 
industry for economic growth is also a prominent theme 
across Australia’s NCS documents. For example, in the 
2016 NCS, it states that “the Government’s commitment 
to cyber security will help businesses to diversify and 
develop new markets, laying the foundations for a 
prosperous future. [Moreover], the Government will 
also support Australia’s cyber security sector to expand 
and promote their capabilities to the global market” [26, 
p. 10]. 
 
4.4. Security and protective actions 
 
A key component of an NCS is how a country’s 
citizens, critical infrastructure, and digital information 
will be protected. Our results indicate that NCS 
documents focus on five areas: identifying 
cybersecurity gaps, rights and freedoms, standards and 
guidance, protecting citizens and critical infrastructure, 
and law enforcement.  
 
4.4.1. Canada Identifying cybersecurity gaps – The 
2018 NCS focuses on developing the baseline 
cybersecurity maturity for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). For example, “small and medium 
enterprises face similar challenges securing their 
systems and networks as their much larger counterparts 
but must do so with less expertise and fewer resources. 
Governments can help correct this asymmetry by 
providing advice and guidance and enhancing access to 
cyber security information and tools” [27, p. 20]. To 
mitigate this risk, the Canadian government launched 
CyberSecure Canada, a cybersecurity certification 
program to help small and medium-sized enterprises to 
defend themselves from cyber threats and to protect 
their business, clients, and partners.  
Rights and freedoms – Compared to the 2010 NCS, 
the 2018 NCS has a greater emphasis on the importance 
of protecting the online rights and freedoms. In the 2018 
NCS, the federal government states that it will “work 
with its international partners to advance Canadian 
interests. This includes advocating for an open, free, and 
secure internet” [27, p. 32].  
Standards and guidance – Similarly, the 2010 NCS 
does not discuss this theme at length. However, the 2018 
NCS does recognize that “organizations have asked for 
cyber security standards or legislation in Canada to 
clarify requirements and expectations to improve their 
cyber security” [27, p. 11]. 
Protecting citizens and critical infrastructure – 
This theme has been prominent across both Canadian 
NCS documents. The 2018 NCS states that “we must 
and will strengthen the Government’s capability to 
detect, deter and defend against cyber attacks while 
deploying cyber technology to advance Canada’s 
economic and national security interests” [27, p. 9]. 
Law enforcement – Both NCS documents discuss 
the importance of helping law enforcement expand the 
scope of its policing to the digital environment. For 
example, the 2010 NCS recognizes that “Canada’s law 
enforcement agencies cannot combat transnational 
cybercrimes with outdated investigative power and 
tools” [23, p. 13]. In response, the federal government 
“improved the capacity of the [Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police] and law enforcement agencies to 
combat cybercrime, including initial investments in 
cybercrime intelligence, investigations and training” 
[27, p. 6]. 
 
4.4.2. The United Kingdom Identifying cybersecurity 
gaps – In the 2016 NCS, the United Kingdom identifies 
several unique avenues to improve its cybersecurity 
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capabilities. First, the United Kingdom plans to improve 
the security within products and ensure that “future 
online products and services coming into use are ‘secure 
by default’” [30, p. 35]. Second, the 2016 NCS discusses 
how “current incident management remains somewhat 
fragmented across government departments… The 
[National Cyber Security Centre] will deliver a 
streamlined and effective government-led incident 
response function…” [30, p. 44].  
Rights and freedoms – Protecting online rights and 
freedoms has been a key attribute of the United 
Kingdom’s NCS. For example, in the 2009 NCS, it 
states that “we are determined to tackle the threats, but 
in a way which balances security with respect for 
privacy and fundamental rights” [24, p. 4].  Moreover, 
one of the four major objectives of the United 
Kingdom’s NCS is stated in the third objective as 
“Helping to shape an open, stable and vibrant 
cyberspace which the UK public can use safely and that 
supports open societies” [28, p . 40].  
Standards and guidance – The United Kingdom’s 
NCS emphasizes development of standards and 
guidance to establish norms and acceptable behavior. 
For example, in the 2016 NCS, the government plans to 
“set the domestic and international framework to protect 
our interest” and “set standards we expect key 
companies and organizations to meet” [30, p. 26].  
Protecting citizens and critical infrastructure – 
The United Kingdom’s 2016 NCS discusses at length 
the importance of building capabilities and deterring 
cyber threat actors to protect its citizens and critical 
infrastructure. For example, two of the three sections in 
the implementation plan are DEFEND and DETER. 
Moreover, the 2016 NCS states that “the UK makes 
clear that the full spectrum of our capabilities will be 
used to deter adversaries and to deny them opportunities 
to attack us” [30, p. 47].    
Law enforcement – Since 2009, law enforcement 
has been an important part of the NCS. For example, “… 
an effective response to e-crime requires a broad cross-
governmental response involving law enforcement, 
regulators and national security agencies” [24, p. 24]. 
Moreover, it is important to “enhance the UK’s law 
enforcement capabilities and skills at [the] national, 
regional, and local level to identify, pursue, prosecute 
and deter cyber criminals within the UK and overseas” 
[30, p. 48]. 
 
4.4.3. Australia Identifying cybersecurity gaps – The 
2020 NCS identifies incident management and security 
by design as important cybersecurity risks to address. 
Moreover, the 2020 NCS states that “the Australian 
Government will work with large businesses and 
services providers to provide SMEs with cyber security 
information and tools as part of ‘bundles’ of secure 
services” [25, p. 10]. 
Rights and freedoms – Protecting online rights and 
freedoms has been recognized since Australia’s first 
NCS. For example, in the 2009 NCS it states, “Australia 
must pursue cyber security policies that enhance 
individual and collective security while preserving 
Australians’ right to privacy and other fundamental 
values and freedoms” [29, p. 6]. Surprisingly, we 
observed a decrease in the emphasis of this theme in 
Australia’s third NCS compared to its first and second. 
Standards and guidance – Developing and 
embracing best practices is a common theme across all 
NCS versions. For example, in the 2016 NCS, 
“Australia supports a cyberspace in which states abide 
by international law and their behaviour is supported 
and reinforced by agreed norms – or standards for 
appropriate conduct” [26, p. 9]. 
Protecting citizens and critical infrastructure – 
Since the first NCS, “the aim of the Australian 
government’s cyber security policy is the maintenance 
of a secure, resilient, and trusted electronic operating 
environment that supports Australia’s national security” 
[29, p. 12]. Similar sentiments are expressed in the 
second and third versions of the NCS as well. 
Law enforcement – Building law enforcement 
capabilities is a focus in each NCS. For example, in the 
2020 NCS it states that, “law enforcement agencies will 
be given greater ability to protect Australians online, 
just as they do in the physical world, and will target 
criminal activity on the dark web” [25, p. 9]. 
5. Discussion  
The existing research literature has largely focused 
on conducting cross-sectional, point-in-time 
comparisons of NCS documents between countries. 
However, comparability may be limited if studies 
evaluate a country’s first NCS version to another 
country’s second or third NCS iteration. Over time, 
revised versions of an NCS may be more comprehensive 
than earlier versions and make improvements to address 
gaps. For example, Schallbruch and Skierka [16] find 
Germany’s revised NCS to be more comprehensive than 
its first.  
Our longitudinal study expands this line of research 
by examining the changes over time across three 
additional countries. Similarly, our results indicate that 
each successive NCS version is more comprehensive 
since more stakeholders are involved in its 
development, more details about its action plans are 
provided, and greater emphasis is placed on certain 
themes that lacked attention in previous versions. 
Although it was beyond the scope of this study to 
determine the underlying drivers of NCS changes, our 
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study takes a first step towards such an inquiry by 
recognizing the types of changes that occur. We 
acknowledge the potential value of comparing the 
benefits received through incremental improvements to 
an NCS, versus improvements that are induced by 
specific problems in a prior NCS version.  
Based on the results of our within-country analysis, 
some themes received more attention as the country 
developed a more mature NCS. For example, investing 
in research and development, as well as developing the 
future workforce (both contained within the “preparing 
for the future theme”) became more important in recent 
NCS documents as countries recognized the need to 
prepare the country for a rapidly changing digital 
environment. On the other hand, we observed that 
certain themes remained stable across multiple NCS 
versions. For example, the ‘understanding the current 
environment’ and ‘teamwork’ themes were fairly stable 
across NCS versions in our sample. In the following 
section, we discuss the insights that emerged from our 
cross-country analysis. 
 
5.1. Cross-country NCS patterns 
 
5.1.1. Understanding the current environment   
Based on our observations, each NCS consistently 
recognizes that society heavily relies on the network-
based technologies and this trend will likely continue. 
Although society has benefited from the Internet, each 
NCS recognizes that this reliance has put our digital 
information in a vulnerable position. Our results 
indicated that this theme was commonly acknowledged 
at the beginning of the NCS and in a personal statement 
from a member of the ruling political party. For 
example, in the Canadian 2010 NCS, the Minister of 
Public Safety states that “our increasing reliance on 
cyber technologies makes us more vulnerable…” [23, p. 
1]. Similarly, the beginning of each NCS introduces the 
concept of cybersecurity, why it is important, and 
examples of cyber threat and cyber threat actors.  
Overall, our findings suggest that these themes help 
the NCS articulate the importance of cybersecurity and 
why the federal government has taken a formal stance 
on this issue. Providing real-world examples of cyber 
threats and cyber threat actors helps the reader relate and 
understand cybersecurity concepts. Overall, this theme 
is important because it introduces fundamental 
cybersecurity concepts to the reader, and it highlights 
the importance of adopting appropriate cybersecurity 
practices. Overall, this leads to our first proposition: 
 
Proposition 1 – Each successive NCS version for a 
country will remain consistent in its emphasis on the 
current digital environment and provide examples of 
emerging cyber threats and cyber threat actors. 
5.1.2. Teamwork   
Based on our observations, each country’s NCS 
consistently recognizes the importance of collaboration 
between the federal government and its domestic and 
international partners. Moreover, each NCS consistently 
emphasizes how cybersecurity is a collective 
responsibility that involves individuals, businesses, and 
governments. 
Broadly, this suggests that countries recognize that 
teamwork is an important theme for an NCS to address. 
First, the federal government can seek the advice and 
expertise from its partners to understand emerging 
technologies and their risks. Second, cybersecurity is a 
multi-dimensional challenge that affects multiple 
stakeholders in different ways. For example, individuals 
may be more concerned with their personal privacy, 
whereas governments are more concerned about 
protecting its critical infrastructure and national 
security. Collaborating with partners can provide 
important insights to help develop a comprehensive 
NCS that addresses the unique needs of each 
stakeholder group. Third, cyber threats are not bounded 
by traditional borders and cyber threat actors can launch 
attacks from anywhere in the world. Establishing 
relationships and shared cybersecurity goals with 
international partners can mitigate this risk. Fourth, 
ordinary individuals are ultimately targeted by cyber 
threats on a day-to-day basis. Individuals need to learn 
and adopt cybersecurity practices to protect themselves, 
their families, and their businesses. An NCS cannot be 
implemented effectively if individuals are not cyber-
literate. This leads to our second proposition: 
 
Proposition 2 – Each successive NCS version for a 
country will remain consistent in its emphasis that 
cybersecurity is a shared responsibility and 
collaboration between the federal government and its 
partners is important. 
 
5.1.3. Preparing for the future  
Based on our observations, revised versions of a 
NCS place more emphasis on research and development 
and developing the workforce of the future. A future-
oriented NCS enables a country to be proactive and 
prepare for future risks. For example, in Canada’s first 
NCS, we noted there was limited discussion of these two 
themes. However, Canada’s second NCS includes a new 
section “Cyber Innovation”, which discusses these two 
themes at length and provides more examples of actions 
that the government plans to implement. Moreover, each 
NCS recognizes the growing importance of 
cybersecurity for economic growth. This includes 
developing a safe and secure online environment for 
individuals and business to conduct e-commerce and 
supporting companies to introduce new and innovative 
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cybersecurity products to the marketplace. Therefore, 
we suggest the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3 – Each successive NCS version for a 
country will increasingly focus on research and 
development opportunities and workforce development. 
 
5.1.4. Security and protective actions 
Based on our observations, there are interesting 
similarities and differences across countries. First, each 
NCS consistently discusses the security and protection 
of its citizens and critical infrastructure. This finding 
aligns with our expectations that it is one of the key 
reasons for an NCS to be developed in the first place. 
Second, each NCS consistently emphasizes the 
importance of investing and enabling law enforcement 
to police in the digital environment. Third, each NCS 
consistently recognizes the importance of establishing 
trust and confidence in the federal government’s 
leadership to protect its citizens and its critical 
infrastructure. Moreover, it is important that 
individuals, businesses, and governments trust that the 
digital environment is safe and secure to conduct their 
online activities.  Fourth, we noted that revised NCS 
documents placed a greater focus on developing 
standards and guidance to establish a framework of 
acceptable online behavior. Fifth, revised NCS 
documents have identified unique cybersecurity gaps to 
mitigate. Canada’s 2018 NCS has taken a strong 
position in developing the baseline cybersecurity 
capabilities of SMEs whereas the United Kingdom and 
Australia have taken a strong focus in incident 
management and security-by-design in product 
development. Overall, we observed that security and 
protection is a prominent theme throughout each NCS, 
but the underlying elements tend to fluctuate over time. 
This leads to our fourth proposition: 
 
Proposition 4 – Each successive NCS version for a 
country will remain consistent in its emphasis of how the 
federal government will secure and protect the digital 
information of its citizens and critical infrastructure, 





We used content analysis to analyze the NCS 
documents from Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia between 2009 and 2020. Our results indicate 
that there is one set of themes (understanding the current 
environment, teamwork) that is consistently emphasized 
in each version of an NCS, as well as another set of 
themes (preparing for the future, security and protective 
actions) that is more susceptible to change in revised 
NCS versions.  
From a research perspective, our study makes a 
unique contribution by moving beyond a cross-sectional 
view of a country’s NCS to consider how the strategies 
change over time across multiple countries. Our 
resulting four research propositions synthesize the 
patterns that we have identified and form a basis for 
future inquiries into contexts where change or stability 
play an important role in the ongoing development of 
governmental policy regarding cybersecurity. 
From a practical perspective, our results can aid 
countries that have not published their first NCS or are 
planning to issue a revised version, as our study 
provides insights into the themes that other countries 
have focused their attention on. Investing in research 
and development and the workforce of the future have 
garnered increased attention over time and have become 
important pillars in recent NCS publications. Moreover, 
the current environment and teamwork themes are 
foundational elements for all NCS documents. 
 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
 
As with any study, this work is subject to several 
limitations that provide opportunities for future 
investigation. First, our analysis focuses on NCS 
changes in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 
but it is unclear if the conclusions we draw can be 
generalized to other countries. As such, future research 
should seek to examine NCS changes in regions not 
addressed in our analysis, as well as in cases where NCS 
changes occur more or less frequently than in the 
countries we examined. Second, our study focused 
exclusively on NCS documents and did not examine 
supplemental content. Future research could examine 
supplemental materials, such as cybersecurity action 
plans. Finally, our study did not consider the impact of 
political ideology on the development of the NCS. 
Because the NCS is developed by the federal 
government, the sentiment, tone, and strategy itself may 
be influenced by political ideology. For example, 
Canada’s first NCS was issued in 2010 under the 
Conservative Party of Canada, and its second NCS was 
issued in 2018 under the Liberal Party of Canada.  
6. Conclusion  
We undertook a longitudinal study to examine the 
stability and changes to the NCS documents of Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia over time. Our 
results suggest that revised NCS versions share some 
key elements, such as a growing emphasis regarding the 
importance of investing in research and development, as 
well as developing the workforce of the future. 
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Moreover, we saw consistent attention paid to 
understanding the current environment and teamwork 
across each country’s initial and revised NCS releases. 
Overall, our study provides insights into both stable and 
changing characteristics of NCS documents over time. 
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